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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY - Residency Rule
for Admission to Bar Violates Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 105 S. Ct.
1272 (1985).
In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper1 the United
States Supreme Court declared New Hampshire's residency
rule2 for admission3 to the bar unconstitutional.4 The Court
1. 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985).
2. N.H. Sup. Cr. R. 42 provides: "Any person domiciled in the United States and
who either is a resident of the State of New Hampshire or filed a statement of intention
to reside in the State of New Hampshire shall be eligible to apply for examination pro-
vided he is possessed of qualifications hereinafter provided."
Each state has either no resident requirement for admission to the bar by examina-
tion, a simple residency requirement (residence or intent to establish residence in-state
at time of application, examination or admission to the bar) or a durational residency
requirement (residence in-state for a fixed period before application, examination or
admission to the bar). See generally, Note, A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Resi-
dency Requirements Under The Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1461, 1478-83 (1979). States with no residency requirement for
admission to the bar include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Dis-
trict of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin. See D.
SKIBBE, NATIONAL BAR EXAMINATION DIGEST 8-43 (1985 ed.). The following states
have simple residency requirements: Colorado (COLO. Sup. CT. R. 201.14); Delaware
(DEL. SUP. CT. R. 52(a)(7)); Idaho (IDAHO SUP. CT. R. 3-10); Indiana (IND. SUP. CT.
R. AD 12, 13(1)); Iowa (IOWA Sup. CT. R. 6-102(2)); Kansas (KAN. Sup. Cr. R. 702);
Kentucky (KY. Sup. CT. R. 2.010(2)); Maine (MAINE BD. OF BAR EXAMINERS, R.
7D); Minnesota (MINN. Sup. CT. R. II. (30)); Nevada (NEv. Sup. CT. R. 51.3); New
Hampshire (N.H. Sup. CT. R. 42); New Jersey (N.J. SuP. CT. R. 1:21-(a)); North Caro-
lina (N.C. Sup. C. (Admission to Practice) § 9501); Oklahoma (OKLA. SUP. CT. R. 1);
South Dakota (S.D. BD. OF BAR EXAMINERS R. 16-16-2); Texas (TEx. Sup. CT. R. II
A); Utah (UTAH Sup. CT. R. 78-51-10); Virginia (VA. Sup. CT. R. 54-60). States with
durational residency requirements include: Arkansas (ARK. Sup. CT. R. III) (60 days);
Hawaii (HAWAII SuP. CT. R. 15(c)) (three months); Missouri (Mo. Sup. CT. R. VI) (six
months); Montana (MONT. Sup. CT. R. VI) (six months); New Mexico (N.M. BAR
EXAMINERS R. 8(c)) (90 days); Rhode Island (R.I. Sup. CT. R. 33) (three months);
Tennessee (TENN. Sup. CT. R. 16) (two months); Wyoming (WYO. Sup. CT. R. 5) (six
months). See 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY Part VIII, American Bar
Association Section (1985).
3. Attorneys may also be admitted to the bar by reciprocity (commonly called ad-
mission by motion) and diploma privilege. States which admit by reciprocity have a
simple requirement which makes practice of law in another state for a fixed period of
time necessary for admission (Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming). Other states require attorney applicants to pass a
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applied a constitutional analysis combining a fundamental
rights analysis5 with a two-pronged test of substantiality. 6
The majority then called the opportunity to practice law a
privilege protected by the privileges and immunities clause of
article IV.7
Justice White, concurring, suggested that a Supreme
Court evaluation of the facial validity of the residency require-
ment was unnecessary. Justice Rehnquist dissented and
maintained that as a non-national profession, the practice of
modified examination for admission to practice (Alaska, Arkansas, California, Maine,
Maryland, Oregon, Utah). Wisconsin is the only state allowing admission to the bar by
diploma privilege. See generally D. SKIBBE, supra note 2.
4. The Supreme Court held Rule 42 in violation of the privileges and immunities
clause of U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States."
The terms "citizens" and "residents" are used interchangeably for analysis under
article IV. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 n.8 (1975). See also Piper,
105 S. Ct. at 1276 n.6. For a discussion of the privileges and immunities clause see
generally Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the TRUE Meaning of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause ofArticle Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1967); Varat, State
"Citizenship " and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHi. L. REV. 487 (1981).
5. The fundamental rights analysis is used to determine if the interest of the nonres-
ident, who is subjected to discrimination based on his nonresidence, is worthy of protec-
tion by the privileges and immunities clause. See infra text accompanying notes 36-61.
A fundamental right protected by the clause is an interest promoting national unity.
Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978) (nonresidents'
right to elk hunting is not fundamental).
6. Piper, 105 S. Ct. at 1276-80. The test of substantiality requires a state to justify
its discriminatory practices by proving that 1) there is substantial reason for the dis-
crimination and 2) there is a reasonable relationship between nonresidents and the dis-
crimination practiced. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1978).
7. Piper, 105 S. Ct. at 1281. The privileges and immunities clause of article IV is
distinguishable from the privileges or immunities clause of U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States .... For a discussion of the 14th amend-
ment privileges or immunities clause see Comment, The Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 142 (1984). See
also Benoit, The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Can
There Be Life After Death?, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 61 (1976); Beth, The Slaughter-
House Cases -Revisited, 23 LA. L. REV. 487 (1963); Kurland, The Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last"?, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405 (1972);
Lomen, Privileges and Immunities Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 WASH. L.
REV. 120 (1943); McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause - Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 4 IOWA L. BULL. 219 (1918); Morris, What are the Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens of the United States?, 28 W. VA. L.Q. 38 (1921).
8. Piper, 105 S. Ct. at 1281 (White, J., concurring).
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law should be viewed differently from other occupations
under the privileges and immunities clause. 9
The purpose of this Note is to examine the Piper decision
in light of the majority's holding. It will discuss the factual
background of Piper, but focus primarily on the United States
Supreme Court's constitutional analysis of privileges and im-
munities clause challenges. More specifically, this Note will
show how federal courts and state supreme courts have ap-
plied that analysis to bar residency rules. Finally, this Note
will review the impact of the majority's holding upon the legal
profession.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1979, Vermont resident Kathryn Piper applied to take
the February 1980 New Hampshire bar examination and sub-
mitted a statement of intent to become a New Hampshire resi-
dent. 10  After passing the bar examination, the New
Hampshire Board of Bar Examiners informed Piper of her
need to establish a home address11 in New Hampshire to be-
come a member of the bar.1 2 Piper made a request to the
Clerk of the New Hampshire Supreme Court for a waiver
9. Id. at 1282-83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 1274. This statement of intent fulfills the requirement of N.H. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 21:6 (1983) which states:
A resident or inhabitant or both of this state and of any city, town or other
political subdivision of this state shall be a person who is domiciled or has a
place of abode or both in this state and in any city, town or other political subdi-
vision of this state, and who has through all of his actions, demonstrated a cur-
rent intent to designate that place of abode as his principal place of physical
presence for the indefinite future to the exclusion of all others.
Id. For a discussion of the difference in meaning between residence and domicile in
state statutes see Reese & Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence", 6 VAND. L. REV.
561 (1953).
11. In his concurring opinion, Justice White suggested that the Court could later
consider whether New Hampshire may condition bar membership upon maintaining a
law office in that state. 105 S. Ct. at 1281 (White, J., concurring). Maintaining an in-
state law office will satisfy the residency requirement in: Delaware, Iowa, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Jersey, South Dakota and Utah. See generally D. SKIBBE, supra note 2.
12. Piper, 105 S. Ct. at 1274. Rule 42 has been interpreted to mean that an appli-
cant to the New Hampshire bar must be a bona fide resident of the state at the time of
swearing in. Id. at 1275 n.1. Piper lives only 400 yards from the New Hampshire bor-
der. Id. at 1274.
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from the residency requirement. 13 Her request denied, 4 Piper
formally petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court to be-
come a member of the bar. Again, she met denial.' 5
Piper commenced an action against the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, its five Justices and its Clerk, alleging that
New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 42 violated the privi-
leges and immunities clause 16 of article IV. 7  The United
States District Court for the District of New Hampshire held
that Rule 42 did not comply with the privileges and immuni-
ties clause and granted Piper's motion for summary judg-
ment.18  The district court found the practice of law to be a
fundamental right protected by the clause. 19 The district
court also held that Piper's nonresidence was not a source of
any evil remedied by the residency rule and New Hampshire's
exclusion of nonresident applicants was not closely tailored to
its objectives. °
13. Id. at 1274. Piper's request, based on special circumstances in her case, were
explained in a letter to Ralph Wood, Esq., Clerk of New Hampshire Supreme Court.
The special circumstances were an unwillingness to move from a home mortgaged at an
attractive interest rate and the recent birth of a child. These "problems peculiar to [her]
situation ... warrant[ed] that an exception be made." Id.
14. See id. at 1274.
15. Id.
16. The privileges and immunities clause of article IV has only recently become the
focus of many challenges against state bar residency requirements. See, e.g., Stalland v.
South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners, 530 F. Supp. 155 (D.S.D. 1982); Strauss v. Ala-
bama State Bar, 520 F. Supp. 173 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Canfield v. Wisconsin Bd. of Attor-
neys Professional Competence, 490 F. Supp. 1286 (W.D. Wis. 1980); Golden v. State
Bd. of Law Examiners, 452 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Md. 1978), vacated, 614 F.2d 943 (4th
Cir. 1980); Noll v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 649 P.2d 241 (Alaska 1982); Sargus v. West Vir-
ginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 249 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1982); Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n,
620 P.2d 640 (Alaska 1980); Gordon v. Comm. on Character and Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d
266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979).
17. Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 539 F. Supp. 1064 (D.N.H. 1982).
In her suit, Piper also alleged that Rule 42 excludes nonresident attorneys from the New
Hampshire bar. See 105 S. Ct. at 1274-75. However, Piper was not totally excluded
from practicing law in New Hampshire. As an out-of-state attorney she may have been
able to appear pro hac vice in state court. Id. at 1275 n.2.
18. Piper, 539 F. Supp. at 1064.
19. Id. at 1071.
20. Id. at 1073. In reaching its holding, the district court applied the "test of sub-
stantiality" found in the United States Supreme Court's constitutional analysis for privi-
leges and immunities clause cases. See supra note 6. The district court also considered
whether the traditional deference given to the states in regulation of the practice of law
amounted to an exception in coverage of constitutional provisions. The court reasoned
that the United States Supreme Court has not created an exception to the due process
clause, equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, or the freedom of speech
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The First Circuit Court of Appeals found that Rule 42 was
reasonably related to furthering the state's legitimate interests
and, therefore, did not violate the privileges and immunities
clause. 21 On en banc reconsideration, however, the First Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's decision in Piper's favor.22
The circuit court ultimately determined that Rule 42 was not
substantially related to the state's regulatory purposes and,
therefore, violative of the privileges and immunities clause.23
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire appealed and the
United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.24
II. BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Analysis of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause
In a privileges and immunities clause challenge, the
United States Supreme Court typically applies a two-pronged
constitutional analysis.2 5 The analysis consists of a fundamen-
tal rights analysis and a two-pronged "test of substantiality.
26
First, the fundamental rights analysis is applied to decide if
the nonresident's interest violated by the state is a privilege
protected by the privileges and immunities clause.27 In order
to be protected by the clause, the interest must be a fundamen-
tal right.28 A fundamental right is an interest basic to national
clause of the first amendment and concluded that there was no exception to the privi-
leges and immunities clause. Id. at 1071.
21. Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 F.2d 98 (1st Cir. 1983). The
state's legitimate interest is the state's ability to function as a sovereign entity. Id. at
102.
22. Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1983).
23. Id. at 118.
24. Piper, 104 S. Ct. 2149 (1984). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1976) a court of
appeals case may be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court on appeal by a state.
The state's statute must have been held by a court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant
to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States.
25. By combining the fundamental rights analysis of Baldwin v. Montana Fish and
Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) and the two-pronged "test of substantiality" from
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978), the Supreme Court devised its constitutional
analysis for privileges and immunities clause cases.
26. See supra notes 5-6.
27. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383-84.
28. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. 371 (1978). In Baldwin, the Court found that elk hunt-
ing was not a fundamental right because it was a recreational activity and not a means
of livelihood. Id. at 388. See generally Constitutional Law - The Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause of Article IV,- Fundamental Rights Revived - Baldwin v. Fish & Game
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unity.2 9 If it is determined that the nonresident's interest is
not a fundamental right, the constitutional analysis ends.3 °
If the Court concludes that the nonresident interest is in-
deed a fundamental right, it will apply the second part of its
constitutional analysis, the two-pronged "test of substantial-
ity."31 At this point, the burden of proof shifts to the state to
offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its rule. 2
Under this test, the state must first provide a substantial rea-
son for its discrimination.3 This is accomplished by proving
that nonresidents "constitute a peculiar source of the evil" at
which the discriminatory statute is aimed.34 To pass constitu-
tional muster, the state must satisfy the second prong and
prove the existence of "a reasonable relationship between the
evil represented by nonresidents as a class and the discrimina-
tion practiced upon them. '35
Commission, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), 55 WASH. L. REV. 461, 462 (1978) (Baldwin's funda-
mental rights analysis makes recreational activity unlikely to be considered fundamen-
tal). However, the Court has never held that just economic pursuits are fundamental.
See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (residency requirement of Georgia abortion
statute violated the privileges and immunities clause); see also Piper, 105 S. Ct. at 1277
n.11.
29. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388. In Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371, 6 F.
Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3,230), Justice Washington, sitting as Circuit Justice,
recognized the "fundamental rights" protected by the privileges and immunities clause
as: "The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state,
for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the bene-
fit of the writ of habeas corpus, to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the
courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal .... "
Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272, 1277 n.10 (quoting Coryell, 6 F. Cas. at 552). Mr. Justice Wash-
ington based this concept of "fundamental rights" on a "natural rights" theory. Bald-
win, 436 U.S. at 387. However, the natural rights theory is no longer applied to
fundamental rights. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939). See generally Meyers,
The Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States, 1 MICH. L. REV. 286
(1903) (early 20th century analysis of rights considered fundamental).
30. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388.
31. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. at 525-26. For background on Hicklin, see
generally Note, Domicile Preferences in Employment: The Case of Alaska Hire, 1978
DUKE L.J. 1069.
32. This test of substantiality "permits disparate treatment of non-residents, but
only where the very fact of their non-residents [sic] demonstrably creates problems for
legitimate state objectives that cannot be remedied in less discriminatory ways." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 6-33, at 410 (1978).
33. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 525.
34. Id. at 525-26.
35. Id. at 526.
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B. Constitutional Analysis Applied To Bar Residency Rules
The majority of cases challenging bar residency rules
under the privileges and immunities clause 36 have applied the
Supreme Court's constitutional analysis to durational resi-
dency requirements. As a simple residency requirement, New
Hampshire's Rule 42 falls outside of that category.37
Gordon v. Committee on Character and Fitness38 was the
first state case in which a residency statute was successfully
attacked under the privileges and immunities clause.39 The
New York law4° in Gordon41 required that an applicant for
admission to practice be an "actual" resident for six months
36. For cases where state bar residency rules have also been challenged under the
equal protection clause see: Golden v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 452 F. Supp. 1082
(D. Md. 1978), vacated, 614 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Davis, 350 F. Supp. 1225
(S.D. W. Va. 1972); Suffling v. Boudurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D. N.M. 1972), aff'd
mem. sub nor., Rose v. Boudurant, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972); Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F.
Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Potts v. Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of
Hawaii, 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii 1971); Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp. 1259
(N.D. Ga. 1970); Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C.
1970); Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, 357 P.2d 782 (1960), appeal dismissed per curiam
sub nom., Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961). For cases where the state bar resi-
dency rules have been challenged under the right to interstate travel see: Wilson v.
Wilson, 416 F. Supp. 984 (D. Or. 1976), aff'd mem., 430 U.S. 925 (1977); Suffling v.
Boudurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972), aff'd mem. sub nom., Rose v. Boudurant,
409 U.S. 1020 (1972); Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350
(E.D.N.C. 1970); Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976). See generally Note, The Sher-
man Act and BarAdmission Residence Requirements, 8 U. MicH. J.L. REF., 615 (1975);
See Comment, Commerce Clause Challenge to State Restrictions on Practice by Out-of-
State Attorney, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 737 (1978).
37. For an explanation of simple and durational residency requirements for admis-
sion to the bar and for examples of those rules see supra note 2.
38. 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979). See generally Note,
The Constitutionality of State Residency Requirements for Attorney Under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause: The Attack Continues, 60 NEB. L. REv. 200 (1981).
39. See Wilson v. Wilson, 416 F. Supp. 984 (D. Or. 1976), aff'd, 430 U.S. 925
(1977) (Oregon's residency requirement for admission to the bar upheld). Wilson was
decided before the Supreme Court's revitalization of the privileges and immunities
clause in Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) and in
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978). See also Golden v. State Bd. of Law Examin-
ers, 452 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Md. 1978), vacated, 614 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980) (appeal
rendered moot where residency requirement for application to take Maryland bar exam-
ination was repealed); Canfield v. Wisconsin Bd. of Attorneys Professional Competence,
490 F. Supp. 1286 (W.D. Wis. 1980) (action dismissed because I1th amendment barred
suit against State of Wisconsin and Wisconsin Supreme Court. The action was dis-
missed as to remaining defendant for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted).
40. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 9406 (McKinney 1978).
41. 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979).
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immediately preceding submission of an application. 42 The
New York Court of Appeals held that the rule "worked invid-
ious discrimination. '43 The court further noted that the rule
forced attorneys already admitted to the bar of another state
to give up the practice of law for six months or longer if they
sought admission to the New York bar.44
In Strauss v. Alabama State Bar,4 Alabama Bar Rule
IV(A) was interpreted to require an applicant to reside in-
state for three weeks prior to the bar examination.46 The state
did not attempt to show that nonresident attorneys consti-
tuted "a peculiar source of evil," and the district court held
that the durational residency requirement did "little to ensure
that applicants are qualified" since the three week period was
not used for the observation and evaluation of applicants.47
Thirty-day residency requirements were challenged in
both Sheley v. Alaska Bar Association4 and Sargus v. West
Virginia Board of Law Examiners.49 Citing Sheley, the Sargus
court stated: "We believe that the bar residency requirement
is the sort of economic protectionism that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution was
designed to prevent."' 50  The durational residency require-
ments were determined to be in violation of the privileges and
immunities clause in both Alaska and West Virginia. 1
Alaska's durational domiciliary rule was invalidated. 52 How-
ever, in Noll v. Alaska Bar Association,53 Alaska's simple dom-
42. Id. at -, 397 N.E.2d at 1310, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 641. For an explanation of
"actual resident" within meaning of statute see In re Tang, 39 A.D.2d 357, 333
N.Y.S.2d 964 (1972), appeal dismissed, 35 N.Y.2d 851, 321 N.E.2d 879, 363 N.Y.S.2d
88 (1974); Tang v. Appellate Div., 373 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd on other
grounds, 487 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974).
43. 48 N.Y.2d at -, 397 N.E.2d at 1312, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
44. Id.
45. 520 F. Supp. 173 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
46. Id. at 175.
47. Id. at 178.
48. 620 P.2d 640 (Alaska 1980). The residency rule in Sheley was ALASKA SUP.
Cr. R. (Admission to Bar) 2(1)(e).
49. 294 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1982). The rule challenged in Sargus was W. VA. SUP.
CT. APP. R. 1.000.
50. Sargus, 294 S.E.2d at 444 (quoting Sheley, 620 P.2d at 646).
51. In Alaska, the rule was invalidated by Sheley, 620 P.2d at 646. In West Vir-
ginia, the rule was invalidated by Sargus, 294 S.E.2d at 444.
52. Sheley, 620 P.2d at 646.
53. 649 P.2d 241 (Alaska 1982).
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iciliary requirement was also held in violation of the privileges
and immunities clause.5 4 In the same year, South Dakota's
simple residency rule was found to violate the privileges and
immunities clause.5 The nonresident attorney in Stalland v.
South Dakota Board of Bar Examiners56 wanted to engage in
a multistate law practice while remaining a Minnesota resi-
dent.57 The United States District Court for the District of
South Dakota held that South Dakota's residency rule denied
an attorney's right to practice law on a multistate basis and
burdened lawyers employed by multistate corporations.5 8
Each of the cases cited in this section contained the neces-
sary ingredients for a review by the United States Supreme
Court. However, the plaintiff's successful challenge and the
state's willingness to succumb to that challenge prevented
those cases from reaching the Supreme Court. In Supreme
Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,59 the New Hampshire
Supreme Court's reluctance60 to accept defeat was its down-
fall. The United States Supreme Court was waiting for the
opportunity to apply its constitutional analysis to a bar resi-
dency challenge under the privileges and immunities clause.
The Piper61 case provided the Court with that opportunity.
III. THE PIPER OPINIONS
A. The Majority
The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Powell, af-
firmed the decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals.62
This was achieved through the Supreme Court's application of
54. Id. at 242. The rule held in violation of the privileges and immunities clause
was ALASKA Sup. Cr. R. (Admission to Bar) 5(1)(a)(undated).
55. Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners, 530 F. Supp. 155 (D.S.D.
1982). See S.D. BD. OF BAR EXAMINERS R. 16-1602.
56. 530 F. Supp. 155 (D.S.D. 1982).
57. Id. at 157.
58. Id.
59. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985).
60. The New Hampshire Supreme Court lost two court battles to Kathryn Piper
before finally having its residency rule declared unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985).
See Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 539 F. Supp. 1064 (D.N.H. 1982);
Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 F.2d 110 (lst Cir. 1983).
61. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985).
62. Id. at 1276.
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its constitutional analysis for the privileges and immunities
clause. 3 The Court simply subdivided the constitutional
analysis and used appropriate parts from Piper to fill in each
subdivision."4 The decision first focused on the fundamental
rights analysis. The legal profession satisfied the main re-
quirement of that analysis when the Court held that the prac-
tice of law is important to the national economy.
65
Furthermore, the Court stated that the legal profession's non-
commercial role makes it worthy of protection by the privi-
leges and immunities clause. 6
The Court applied the "test of substantiality" and further
divided it into two prongs; the two prongs appeared as one
because the Court combined them in its analysis.67 Each of
New Hampshire's justifications for its bar residency rule were
rejected. 68 The majority found no evidence that nonresident
attorneys would be lax in their familiarity of local rules and
procedures.69 The Court refused to accept that nonresident
attorneys were less likely to behave ethically: "A lawyer will
be concerned with his reputation in any community where he
practices regardless of where he may live."'7° In addition, the
state's other argument, that a nonresident attorney would on
some occasions be unavailable for court proceedings also met
rejection as the Court reasoned that "even the most conscien-
tious lawyer residing in a distant state" may be unavailable for
unscheduled hearings or proceedings. 71 Finally, the Piper ma-
jority rejected New Hampshire's argument that nonresident
attorneys would neglect their share of pro bono and volunteer
63. Id. at 1276-80.
64. See id. at 1277-81.
65. Id. at 1277.
66. Id. The legal profession's noncommercial role is based on the Court's reason-
ing that "out-of-state lawyers may - and often do - represent persons who raise un-
popular federal claims." Id. See generally Mann, Not for Lucre or Malice: The
Southern Negro's Right to Out-of-State Counsel, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 143 (1969) (sug-
gesting that members of the southern bar tried to prevent out-of-state attorneys from
representing southern blacks during the civil rights movement).
67. See Piper, 105 S. Ct. at 1279-80.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 1279.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1280.
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work because participation in such work serves a lawyer's pro-
fessional interests.72
B. The Concurrence
In concurring, Justice White did not address the major-
ity's application of the Court's constitutional analysis. In-
stead, he stated that Piper, like New Hampshire lawyers living
in New Hampshire, would be able to perform her professional
duties. 73 Justice White called the consideration of the facial
validity of New Hampshire's residency rule unnecessary.
However, he suggested that the constitutionality of condition-
ing membership in the New Hampshire bar upon maintaining
a law office in New Hampshire could be considered at a later
date.74
C. The Dissent
Justice Rehnquist rejected the majority's application of the
constitutional analysis.75 The dissent's argument focused on
the practice of law as fundamentally different from occupa-
tions protected by the privileges and immunities clause in ear-
lier cases. 76  By emphasizing this difference, the dissent
criticized the majority for failing to recognize the legal profes-
sion's need for closer scrutiny under the privileges and immu-
nities clause.77 Justice Rehnquist did not attempt to place the
practice of law above occupations traditionally protected by
the clause,78 but stressed that unlike those occupations, the
legal profession does not easily transfer across state lines be-
cause laws differ.79
IV. CRITIQUE
The Piper decision solidifies the United States Supreme
Court's constitutional analysis by use of both the fundamental
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1281 (White, 3., concurring).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1281-85 (Rehnquist, 3., dissenting).
76. See id. at 1281-85.
77. Id. at 1282.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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rights analysis and the "test of substantiality."" ° However,
this new found strength may be diminished unless the Court
revises its fundamental rights analysis. The fundamental
rights analysis is weakened by its failure to set forth meaning-
ful guidelines in defining rights basic and essential to national
well-being.81 This problem further weakens the constitutional
analysis and, ironically, encourages discrimination against
states by a clause designed to bar state-based discrimination.82
Because of the ease with which the fundamental rights analy-
sis will turn a nonresident's interest into a fundamental right,
the states in privileges and immunities clause cases will often
fail the more stringent "test of substantiality" and conse-
quently have their law invalidated. 3
The Piper Court incorrectly compared the practice of law
to the occupations in earlier privileges and immunities clause
cases. 84  Unlike those professions, the practice of law is a
learned profession.85 In a hasty effort to find the opportunity
to practice law a fundamental right, the Court forgot that law-
yers, unlike shrimpers and pipeline workers, are required to
meet rigorous criteria established by state regulatory boards.
These criteria, including requirements of knowledge and good
80. The fundamental rights analysis and the "test of substantiality" have been used
together in only one other case, United Bldg. Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Coun-
cil of Camden, 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984).
81. For a discussion of critical flaws in the fundamental rights analysis, see gener-
ally 55 WASH. L. RaV. 471, 472 (1975).
82. The United States Supreme Court has held that not all state-based discrimina-
tion is prohibited. States may discriminate against nonresidents concerning the right to
vote, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); the right to hold public office, Kanapaux
v. Ellison, 419 U.S. 891 (1974); the right to receive some state services, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and access to state courts, Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393
(1975).
83. See United Bldg. Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 104
S. Ct. 1020 (1984); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
84. 105 S. Ct. 1272, 1277 (1985). See also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978);
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (1871).
85. See Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 539 F. Supp. 1064, 1071:
"Although there are other professions that provide charitable services, the law is
the only one to recognize pro bono work as an obligation of the profession. At-
torneys maintain a position unique among fiduciaries in that while zealously
guarding their trust to their employer, they are never allowed to forget their
obligations to the public and to the courts that hold them officers. An individual
assuming the position of attorney not only takes up his trade, but assumes a
posture in the administration of justice so vital that in criminal matters, the con-
stitution mandates that society pay the cost when the client cannot."
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moral character, ensure that only skilled and ethical attorneys
are allowed to practice law.86 The Court's comparison in
Piper signals an acceleration of its attempt to reduce the legal
profession to a business. This effort began in In re Griffiths,87
where the Court held that a lawyer is not an officer in the
political sense. 8 It continued in Bates v. Arizona,8 9 where the
Court upheld a lawyer's right to advertise. 90 Finally, the Piper
decision has placed the legal profession on a level which sub-
jects it to equal scrutiny with other occupations under the
privileges and immunities clause.91
The major downfall of the majority's holding in Piper v.
Supreme Court of New Hampshire was correctly noted by the
dissent; the Court clearly ignored the fact that states regulate
the practice of law.9 2 It is highly inconsistent for the United
States Supreme Court to recognize this principle in one case
involving a nonresident attorney and to totally ignore it in an-
other case involving a nonresident attorney. Allowing regula-
tion of the practice of law by the State of New Hampshire
would have saved an overburdened 93 Supreme Court from un-
necessary litigation in Piper.
V. CONCLUSION
In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,94 the United
States Supreme Court declared a state's residency rule for ad-
mission to the bar unconstitutional. The Piper decision, which
will be welcomed by the legal community, will bring lawyers
up-to-date in an increasingly mobile society and broaden op-
portunities for those in multistate practices and interstate cor-
porations. Piper, however, foreshadows an end to state bar
residency rules as they will continue to be challenged under
the privileges and immunities clause. State legislators may be
86. See generally, Note, Residence Requirementsfor Initial Admission to the Bar: A
Compromise Proposal For Change, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 831, 833-35 (1971).
87. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
88. Id. at 728.
89. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
90. Id. at 382.
91. Piper, 105 S. Ct. at 1277.
92. See id. at 1282 (quoting Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam).
93. See Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442
(1983).
94. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985).
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pressured by the decision to abandon their residency require-
ments.95 Those states that desire to retain some vestige of a
residency requirement may stipulate that attorneys reside in-
state for a period after admission to the bar.96 Irrespective of
the response of individual state legislatures, the Piper decision
clearly limits state control over attorneys excluded from the
state bar.97
DEIDRE K. PETERSON
95. See Sargus v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va.
1982); Noll v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 649 P.2d 241 (Alaska 1982); Gordon v. Committee on
Character and Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979).
96. See 92 HARV. L. REV. at 1484-87.
97. The United States Supreme Court refutes this statement. See Piper, 105 S. Ct.
at 1278 n.16.
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